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1. Research history and justification of the topic 
 
I started to work on the Middle East and specifically on the Gulf region in the 
framework of small state studies during the preparation of my MA thesis. With 
the supervision of László Csicsmann, I submitted my research in the 
International Studies Master’s program of the Institute of International Studies 
in 2013 with the focus of interpreting the international behaviour of Qatar using 
small state foreign policy theories. Since then, I worked on widening my 
perspective and deepening my knowledge, both in terms of theory as well as 
the Middle East and the Gulf region. My aim was to exceed the usual framing 
which is based on the differentiation of the neorealist, neoliberal and/or 
constructivist perspectives and to reach a common ground for theories related 
to state size in order to have a more thorough understanding of how smallness 
effects foreign and security policy and to apply these ideas on the Middle East 
and the Gulf region.  
The relevance of the topic is not self-explanatory. Usual analyses 
focus on the larger Middle Eastern states – Saudi Arabia, Iran or Turkey – or 
the global powers interfering in the regional political and economic relations. 
This phenomenon is not contained to Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region but is a general attribute of the discipline of International Relations (IR) 
– it is not surprising that Kenneth Waltz himself – the founding father of 
neorealism – even jokes about those who would build theories on smaller states 
[Waltz, 1979, 72-73]. 
Focusing more on small states in the MENA region and in general 
international relations bears huge importance, at least for three reasons. First of 
all, with exaggerating the importance of material size in world politics, scholars 
have built up a cognitive cage for themselves in which they fail to identify and 
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properly analyse the behaviour and the impact of small states in the 
international system. Second, by the 21st century, the traditional constrains put 
on small states have been significantly eased due to systemic processes like 
globalization, the institutionalisation of world politics, and the emergence of 
complex interdependences. Third, in the Middle Eastern context, the post-2011 
regional environment usually described as competitive 
multipolarity/heteropolarity [Kausch, 2014], in which power is more diffused 
than ever among the actors of international politics. In this context, the leverage 
of smaller and medium-sized states such as Qatar, Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates has grown significantly. 
Therefore the aim of the dissertation was to establish a complex 
model of size (CMS) which 1) excludes every theoretically unproven but 
automatically accepted view of the importance of material capacities, 2) builds 
upon the relevant thoughts and theories related to size and smallness, 3) 
provides a widely applicable theoretical and methodological framework to 
investigate the role of size and small states in international relations, and 4) 
leads to new scientific results.  
After setting up the theoretical background and the methodological 
framework of the CMS, I applied its notions on the Middle Eastern region and 
its small states. I focused my attention on the four small Gulf states, namely 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar.  
The dissertation is the outcome of five years of research. Since 2013, 
I tried to use diverse methods to deepen my understanding of both small state 
theory and the Gulf region. First, I have taught various courses at the Corvinus 
University of Budapest (first in the Doctoral Programme then as an assistant 
lecturer since 2017) including Small State Studies and Middle Eastern Political 
Systems, which helped me share my ideas with students and collect their 
feedbacks. Such discussions have been extremely valuable in developing a 
coherent understanding of the topic.  
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Second, I tried to take part in the international academic life – 
between 2013 and 2015, I developed joint research projects in the Institute for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade focusing on the relations between the Middle East 
and the Visegrad countries. In 2016 and 2017, I participated in the Gulf 
Research Meeting in Cambridge to present two of my papers (both of which got 
published later). Since 2015, I participate in the Horizon 2020 project entitled 
Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture (MENARA), in the 
framework of which I conducted research on the embeddedness of the region in 
the global political and economic system, the role of international non-
governmental organizations, and the Qatari crisis.  
Third, I conducted several research trips to the region – since 2013, I 
managed to visit Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab 
Emirates, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey. In 2018, I also visited the 
United States, where I have met with researchers, governmental and NGO 
partners working in the Middle East. During these trips, I did not only inquire 
about the affairs of the MENA region but also tried to collect as many 
perspectives on state size as possible.  
Fourth, I have tried to play an active role in the Hungarian academic 
life as a teacher of the Corvinus University of Budapest and as a researcher of 
the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade and participated in several 
conferences, workshops and contributed to joint publications with institutions 
like the Strategic Defence Research Centre, the Antall József Knowledge 
Centre, or the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Last but definitely not least, I 
tried to work close and learn from the prominent scholars of IR theory and the 
Middle East in Hungary, especially László Csicsmann, Erzsébet N. Rózsa, 






I organised my research on the basis of two hypotheses:  
H1: A single model (i.e. the complex model of size - CMS) can be set 
up on the basis of previous theories related to size and smallness 
which excludes the researcher bias towards largeness.  
H2: The complex model of size provides a widely applicable 
methodology which leads us to scientific novelties in the research of 
international relations. 
The main method used in the dissertation was formal modelling [Snidal 2002]. 
I set up the complex model of size in order to interpret the process in which 
size effects political outcomes. The CMS has been based on two general ideas: 
1. The differentiation between four kinds of size: on the basis of the overview of 
small state literature, one can differentiate between four different 
conceptualisation of state size (and, consequently, four types of small states), 
all of which can be interpreted using the materialist-idealist and the 
structuralist-individualist dichotomies:1 
 Relative size (materialist structuralism) refers to the amount of the 
“general aggregate resources” (GARs –territory, population, 
economic and military capacities) available to the state in the context 
of the general distribution of such resources in a given international 
system.  
 Absolute size (materialist individualism) is about the availability of 
such resources in the domestic context of a state in comparison with 
an “ideal size” for the survival of the given state; 
 Perceptual size (idealist individualism) refers to the size and strength 
of the state perceived by either the state elites or the society. 
                                                 
1 A separation used by seminal pieces of literature of the constructivist IR 
theory [Wendt, 1999, 22-39; Jepperson – Wendt – Katzenstein, 1996, 36-42]. 
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 Normative size (idealist structuralism) is a result of interstate 
interactions. It refers to the perceived size and importance of the 
given state in the international community.  
2. The contextual analysis of the effects of size. Building on the logic of Peter 
Katzenstein [1985, 136-137], the CMS does not consider size as a “master 
variable” whose importance outgrows the relevance of any other aspects. Size 
interacts with other variables, let that be the extreme scarcity or multitude of a 
given resource, social homogeneity, aspects of regime security, the political 
system, etc. In order to understand how size effects political outcomes, one has 
to analyse these interactions between size and other variables on the one hand, 
and the different types of size on the other. 
In the framework of the complex model of size, I used different 
methods to determine the different types of size of Middle Eastern states: 
 to determine relative size, statistical comparison was conducted to see 
which Middle East states have lower than the average in all four 
general aggregate resources; 
 to investigate normative size, the GDELT database was used to 
determine the intensity of interstate relations in different relations, 
building on the assumption that if a state is considered to be larger, 
the interactions with that state will be more intense; 
 to analyse absolute size, I turned to the interactions between territorial, 
demographic, economic and military smallness and other variables to 
see whether the state compensates for negative consequences of 
small size or not; 
 to set the perceptual size, speech acts made by the representatives of 
the small states were analysed in the United Nations Security 
Council, and a few reliable surveys were presented as well. 
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After the determination of the size of Middle Eastern states and the most 
important systemic and individual, material and immaterial variables which 
affect the way in which size shapes political outcomes, I turned to the 
investigation of the foreign and security policy behaviour of the small Gulf 
states. I have chosen five case studies, all of which connected a specific 
situation with a theoretical question. These include: 
 the talks on a possible Gulf union after the independence of Gulf states 
in the 1970s; 
 the threat perception of small Gulf states after the Iranian Islamic 
revolution of 1979 and during the first Gulf war between Iran and 
Iraq; 
 the changing alliance policy of the small Gulf states as a result of the 
second (1990-1991) and the third (2003) Gulf wars; 
 domestic and foreign policy behaviour during the Arab Uprisings and 
regime stability; 
 the Gulf rift of 2017 and the Qatari survival strategy (the “multi-track 
approach”).  
The methodological steps of the dissertation are summarised in a systemic way 




Chart 1: The methodological steps of the complex model of size 
Steps Level of analysis Specific methods 
1. Analysing the distribution 
of GARs and identify 
relative small states 
Systemic material Statistical comparison 
2. Analysing the material 
systemic variables of the 
regional environment 
Systemic material Interpretative neorealist 
and neoliberal methods 
3. Analysing the immaterial 
systemic variables of the 
regional environment and 
identify the normative size 
of states  
Systemic idealist Interpretative English 
School  methods and 
statistical comparison 
4. Analysis of domestic 
material factors and identify 
the absolute size of states 
Individualist material Traditional 
interpretative   
methods, statistical 
comparison 
5. Analysis of domestic 
immaterial factors and 
identify the perceptual size 
of states 
Individual idealist Traditional 
interpretative IR 
methods , discourse 
analysis and surveys 
6. Selection of case studies 
for social interactions on the 
state level 
Event Case study selection 
7. The analysis of the 
behaviour of small Gulf 
states 
Event, individual and 
systemic 
Interpretative IR and 




3. The main findings of the research 
3.1. Findings regarding the relative and normative size of Middle Eastern 
states 
 Today there are six relative small states in the Middle East which have 
smaller territory, population, economic and military capacities than the 
regional average: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar (the Gulf cluster) as 
well as Jordan and Lebanon (the Mashreq cluster). They rely more on 
trade, they are more urbanised, have a higher HDI value than larger 
states, but do not have a more homogeneous society. 
 The normative size of states (namely their perceived importance in the 
international community) correlates with, though does not equal to 
their relative material size. While Gulf states normatively outgrew the 
Mahsreq cluster, Jordan and Lebanon are still considered more 
important as more governments express confrontation or cooperation 
with them.  
 While Qatar and Bahrain have grown normatively since 1979, other 
complex small states have shrunk or stagnated. Data suggests that 
these tendencies are more to do with international developments and 
foreign policy strategies than actual size.  
 Hostility towards Middle Eastern small states is lower than towards 
larger states. Lebanon has the worst image among them, while Oman 
has the best. 
3.2. Findings regarding the systemic environment of small states of the Middle 
East. 
 
 In general, the Middle East is not as unfavourable for small states as 
one could assume at first glance. It is true that under-
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institutionalisation and lacking integration into the global political and 
economic system deprives shelter for small states, but other aspects 
can compensate for this loss to some extent. 
 The nature of the “Middle Eastern state”, the emergence of the regime-
based institutional framework turns the focus of states to domestic and 
not foreign threats. This process effects small and large states alike, 
equalling their security situation to some extent. 
 The dominance of intra-state and transnational conflicts over 
traditional inter-state ones and the strategy of omni-balancing makes it 
harder for larger states to engage in an armed conflicts with smaller 
and weaker entities. 
 The weakness of states and the diffusion of NGO enlarges the leverage 
of small states vis-á-vis larger ones. 
 The evolution of the balance of power in the region was  beneficial for 
small states in the Mashreq over time and harmful for those in the Gulf  
until 2011. After that, unpredictability effected small and large state in 
a similar way, creating an environment with lower level of security 
coupled with wider potential leverage. 
 The normative dichotomy in Middle Eastern political culture and the 
supra-state group identities (Arabism, Islam, etc.) can serve as a 
security shelter for smaller states (if they are accepted into the club 
like the Arab League) but also as a tool in interstate rivalry. 
 The normative prohibition of interstate conflicts in the Arab family 
deprived larger states of their most effective coercive tool against 
smaller and weaker entities. This prohibition survived until the 1990-
1991 Iraqi-Kuwaiti war. 
 The practice of intervening in each other’s domestic affairs made 
social cohesion as the primary line of defence for small states, while 
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also contributed to the securitisation of social heterogeneity which 
seemed to be the most vulnerable point for each state, including small 
ones. 
 The process of normative fragmentation and sub-regionalism since the 
1980s which was beneficial for small Gulf states but – due to the lack 
of a common geopolitical identity – disenfranchised the small 
Mashreq states. 
 
3.3. Findings regarding the variables interacting with different types of 
smallness in the small Gulf states 
 Territorial size interacts with the climatic environment and geopolitical 
circumstances which deprives small Gulf states from arable land and 
exposes them to Saudi, Iranian and/or Iraqi influence; 
 Demographic size interacts with small territory, the imbalance 
between the demand and supply in the domestic labour market and 
social heterogeneity. Interestingly enough, demographic size also 
interacts with a compensatory policy to tackle demographic smallness, 
namely labour import. The interplay of these variables results in, 
among others, high level of population density and urbanization, the 
need for external labour, the perception of cultural invasion, the 
emergence of ethnocracies; 
 Economic size interacts with large amount of hydrocarbon resources 
and demographic smallness. These led to rentierism and huge fiscal 
leverage for many of the small Gulf states; 
 Military smallness interacts with huge hydrocarbon resources 
(depriving small Gulf states of the ability to relative deterrence), 
systemic developments (urging small Gulf states to build up their own 
military defence capabilities), and also with the alliance-policy of 
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small Gulf states as a compensatory policy (creating new kinds of 
alliance dilemmas).  
3.4. Findings regarding absolute size, perceptual size and regime security 
among the small Gulf states 
 The interaction of absolute size, perceptual size and regime security is 
responsible for the markedly different behaviour of the small Gulf 
states. 
 In the framework of absolute size, all four Gulf state are small in terms 
of territory, population and military, as the governments tried to 
introduce compensatory policies to tackle disadvantages in these 
fields. When it comes to economic capabilities, the small Gulf states 
should not be considered small in the absolute sense. Demographic 
and military smallness is the most pressing for the small Gulf states as 
there are the two dimensions which interact with the most variables, 
causing structural dependencies.  
 Tackling the negative consequences of absolute smallness, Bahrain 
exposed itself to Saudi influence and managed its domestic problems 
arising from social heterogeneity by forceful measures and 
neutralizing Sunni migrant workers. Oman was able to develop its 
agricultural policy, build up the larger army among the small Gulf 
states and chose to deepen security relations with Great Britain and 
was a front-runner in cooperating with the United States. Due to its 
particular domestic politics, Kuwait turned inside and was forced to 
institutionalise power sharing among the rival elite groups; while 
Qatar specialised on natural gas and invited the Muslim Brotherhood 
to help in state-building.  
 When it comes to perceptual size, the investigation showed that 
despite the logical assumption that all small Gulf states perceive 
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themselves small (due to their large neighbours and the minority status 
of the national community), this is not unequivocally seen in the 
diplomatic discourse of these states. Kuwait showed the most visible 
presence of smallness in the national identity, partly (but not 
completely) triggered by the Iraqi invasion.  Qatar does not connect 
the size of resources to the question of international peace and 
stability, which means that even if they see themselves as small, that 
does not limit their perception of their abilities. Bahrain concentrates 
more on cultural heterogeneity and multiculturalism as a source of 
identity and conflict. Smallness plays (or played) a role in the self-
perception of Oman, but not necessarily as a limitation but more as a 
fact of life, as bigger importance is given to cultural, moral and ethical 
questions.  
 In terms of regime security, the Qatari state elites have the most stable 
position with lacking formidable opposition networks. The most 
important challenge for Qatar could be possible intra-regime strife. 
The Omani leading elite is also relatively safe since the defeat of the 
rebel movements in the 1970s, though the security apparatus cracked 
down on opposition networks many times. The weak point of the 
Omani regime is its highly personalised nature. The situation of the 
Bahraini and Kuwaiti regime is more complicated. In both cases, we 
can clearly see intra-regime competition, and also the domestic 
heterogeneity in the two countries is many times mismanaged by the 
governments. 
 
3.5. Findings regarding the foreign and security policy behaviour of the small 
Gulf states 
 The debates about Gulf unity in the 1970s indicated that when 
discussing a possible federation between them, the attitudes of the 
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small Gulf states were shaped more by their relative size to each other 
than by their relative size compared to Saudi Arabia and Iran. This 
notion underlines the point in the CMS that relative size is a regionally 
determined attribute, therefore its effects are dependent on how the 
state identifies its position in a narrower or larger region. 
 Due to relative military smallness, the small Gulf states tended to 
overemphasize military threats over political or domestic threats 
during the Iranian-Iraqi war, which led to sub-optimal decisions and 
miscalculations in foreign policy. Siding with Iraq in the Iraqi-Iranian 
war can be seen retrospectively as a bad decision from Kuwait (and 
also from Bahrain), which did not better their security environment. 
Coupled with domestic pressure on the Shia networks, this strategy 
actually led to less safety. On the other hand, Oman and Qatar tried to 
be as neutral as possible, generally due to their more remote location, 
better relations with pre-revolutionary Iran, and less domestic 
turbulence caused by the war.  
 The effects of the second and third Gulf crisis showed that the level of 
cooperation with the US was dependent on the evaluation of the 
American defence capabilities in terms of both military and political 
threats. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, small Gulf states were 
willing to sacrifice their autonomy for security, while after 2003, their 
priorities diverged, which was in line with systemic changes and the 
emergence of comparative heterogeneity. Kuwait and Bahrain, whose 
perceptual size was smaller than that of Qatar and Oman, prioritised 
security over influence or autonomy, while the Thani regime chose an 
active strategy, whereas the Bu Said regime preferred active neutrality. 
 The events of the Arab Uprisings showed that by the 2010s, the 
foreign policy possibilities of the small Gulf states were not primarily 
17 
 
limited by the size of the states but more by the level of social 
heterogeneity. Mismanaged diversity in Bahrain and Kuwait severely 
decreased their leverage, while Oman and Qatar enjoyed the 
opportunity to contribute to political outcomes in the region. 
 The Gulf rift of 2017 supports the assumption that large normative size 
can be beneficial and disadvantageous for small states. The active 
foreign policy of Qatar turned its neighbours against it. On the other 
hand, it also secured Qatari survival by the previous diversification of 
security relations. The Gulf rift also shows that by the 2010s, if a small 
state is able to bring a rivalry to the dimension of soft power, its 
vulnerability can be reduced significantly. 
 The case studies proved that neorealism, neoliberalism and 
constructivism individually cannot interpret the small Gulf states’ 
foreign and security policy in a comprehensive way. 
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